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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW

-

TERMINATION OF BUSINESS

-

EMPLOYER'S

RIGHT TO PERMANENTLY CLOSE MANUFACTURING PLANT
-

UNION DISCRIMINATION

Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263 (1965).
Darlington Manufacturing Company, a South Carolina corporation operating one textile mill, was substantially owned by Deering
Milliken & Co., which in turn was controlled by Roger Milliken,
president of Darlington. In March of 1956, the Textile Workers
Union began an organizational campaign at Darlington, which in
September of the same year resulted in the election of that union
as the collective bargaining representative. This result was bitterly resented by the company, and it therefore refused to bargain
with the union. The president called a board of directors meeting
to recommend that the plant be closed. Six days after the union
was established at the company, the board decided to liquidate the
corporation and shareholder approval followed in October. The
plant closed in November and equipment was sold at an auction in
December.
The National Labor Relations Board, acting upon a union complaint, found that the Darlington Company had been closed because
of the anti-union motives of Roger Milliken,' its president, and held
that such action was a violation of section 8(a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.' The Board further decided that since Darlington was part of a single, integrated employer group controlled by
Roger Milliken and his family,3 Deering Milliken & Co. could be
held liable for the unfair labor practices of Darlington. Accordingly,
the Board ordered back pay for all Darlington employees until they
had obtained equivalent work or were put on the preferred hiring
'Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
261 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964) provides in
part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization....
3
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.LR.B. 241 (1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Deering Milliken & Co. owned
approximately 41% of the Darlington stock at the time of the 1956 liquidation.
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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

lists at the other Milliken mills. However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that an employer has the absolute prerogative to
cease doing business entirely or to continue it in part regardless of
anti-union motives.' On appeal, the Supreme Court held "that
when an employer closes his entire business, even if the liquidation
is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such action is not
an unfair labor practice."5 But this did not dispose of the case, for
the Court further held "that a partial dosing is an unfair labor practice under [section] 8(a) (3) if motivated by a purpose to chill
unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and
if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that such dosing
[would] ... likely have that effect."6 Since no findings were made as
to the purpose and effect of Darlington's dosing with respect to
employees in other plants in the Deering Milliken group, the case
was remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to remand
to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the Court's
opinion.7
Since the Darlington case was one of first impression, the Supreme Court had to decide whether an employer has the absolute
right to cease doing business for any reason whatsoever. Prior to
Darlington, the only language by the Court alluding to this problem was found in Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, which by no
means resolved the issue. However, the courts of appeal have held
that an employer may cease plant operations entirely without violating section 8, regardless of the fact that an anti-union motive contributed to the shut-down.' What these courts did not say, however,
4

Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Here the court qualified its decision as follows:
Of course, the right of discontinuance which we here uphold, means an
actual, unfeigned and permanent end of operations - not a removal, nor
subcontract, nor a change merely in the form of the corporate entity. No
use or subterfuge is suggested here. Id. at 685.
5 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965).
6 id. at 275.
7 Id. at 277. The Court felt that this procedure was particularly appropriate since
issues of "first impression" were involved.
8315 U.S. 100 (1942). The Court said, "Whether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership - which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the Board's order - or merely a disguised continuance of the old
employer, does not clearly appear...." Id. at 106.
9
NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962). Here the record
indicated that defective merchandise brought about serious consumer dissatisfaction
which resulted in a considerable loss of revenue. In holding that New England Web
had not committed an unfair labor practice under § 8 the court relied on the following premise: "We start with the proposition that a businessman still retains the untrammeled prerogative to close his enterprise when in the exercise of a legitimate
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is that an employer has an absolute right to cease doing business for
any reason whatsoever. In all the prior cases, there was usually
an economic justification for dosing down the particular business
involved, and union organization was considered a legitimate economic factor.' ° In determining whether a shutdown was in fact
justified, prior history of union hostility was considered to be a
relevant factor."
The Supreme Court clearly distinguished the situation in Darlington from that of a "runaway shop,"' 2 in which a company merely
relocates its plant, and a "shutdown" in which employees could cause
a plant to reopen by renouncing the union. 3 Such cases involve discriminatory practices aimed at obtaining some future benefit from
new employees. In contrast, the Darlington Mill was dosed permanently and its assets were sold to a third party. It should be noted
that the Court recognized that its holding in Darlingtonmight have
some adverse effects upon organizational activities of unions, independent of the decision to dose the business; however, the Court did
not consider this to be of sufficient importance in the over-all labormanagement picture to justify altering its decision.'" Even though
such a result might be expected in a marginal business, the Court
saw no practical alternative to its decision in the present case.
Concerning the relationship between Darlington and the Deerand justified business judgment he concludes that such a step is either economically
desirable or economically necessary. This prerogative exists quite apart from whether
or not there is a union on the scene." Id. at 700. See, e.g., NLRB v. New Madrid
Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954); Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211
F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 167 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1948); NLRB v. Tupelo Garment Co., 122 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1941).
10
In NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), the court said,
"the decided cases do not condemn an employer who considers his relationship with
his plant's union as only one part of the broad economic picture he must survey when
he is faced with determining the desirability of making changes in his operation." Id.
at 175.
11NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB
v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961); cf.
NLRB v. Corning Glass Works, 293 F.2d 784 (1st Cir. 1961); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon
Co., 269 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1959).
12E.g., NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962). Here, although the transfer of trucking operations had been decided prior to union activity, it
was emphasized that it was an unfair labor practice to put the transfer into immediate
effect, only after the company had learned of the success of the union's organizational
campaign. In NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952) a similar situation was
presented where a department was closed for anti-union reasons and work was transferred to an independent contractor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d
895 (1st Cir. 1962); Jay Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cit. 1961); NLRB
v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cit. 1959).
13 NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953).
14 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n.20 (1965).
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ing Milliken group, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that
if Darlington were to be viewed as an independent employer, then
closing the business was not an unfair labor practice. On the other
hand, the Court could not accept the view that the same conclusion
would follow if Darlington were considered an integral part of the
Deering Milliken enterprise.1 " Since the Court was unable to determine whether the Deering Milliken group constituted a single enterprise, the case was remanded to the court of appeals for further review of this point. In addition, the Board's findings dealt only with
the foreseeable effect of the Darlington dosing upon Darlington
employees. Thus, the case was also remanded to the Board on this
point for further findings as to the "purpose" and "effect" of the
closing upon employees in other Deering Milliken enterprises.
The Court also drew an analogy between a partial dosing, as
was apparently the situation in Darlington,and the "runaway shop"
and "temporary dosing" cases. The Court intimated that a possible remedy in a case of discriminatory partial dosing, similar to
the remedies available in the latter cases, might be to reinstate the
discharged employees in other parts of the business.1"
Although the Court finally remanded the case for further findings on whether the Deering Milliken group constituted a single
enterprise, there was some discussion of whether an employer who
controls a number of related enterprises is actually to be regarded
as a "single employer" for the purpose of finding a violation of
section 8. Criteria applied in numerous cases 17 in the past to
determine single employer status included whether there were "present unity of interest, common control, dependent operation, sameness
in character of work and unity of labor relations ... .""8 But in
making a determination of this question in Darlington, the Court
did not want to suggest that a close organizational integration of
15 Id. at 274.

l Id.at 275.
17
E.g., NLRB v. Williams, 195 F.2d 669, 672 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
834 (1952). Here the fact that two companies were three-quarters of a mile apart
and that ownership of one was in the name of the wife of the principal owner did not
-destroy its status as a single unit. In NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815 (8th Cit. 1939),
the existence of a single employer was obvious. The corporations involved were family
owned; the business was similar; employees were transferred back and forth; identical
trademarks were often used; and, all the employees recognized the central authority of
one man. See also, NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960); A. M. Andrews Co. v. NLRB, 236 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc.,
193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
18
NLRB v. Gibraltar Indus., Inc., 307 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 911 (1963).
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corporations is a necessary prerequisite to establishing a violation
of section 8(a) (3); therefore, it set out even less stringent criteria
than those above.' 9 In addition, the Court mentioned that the old element of "motivation which is aimed at achieving the prohibited
effect," in addition to concerted anti-union activities, must be shown
before there is a violation of section 8 (a) (3). 0
Thus, the Darlington decision is favorable to labor in that the
adverse effect upon unionism in cases of partial closing has been
reduced, as in the "runaway shop" and "temporary dosing" situations. However, there are potential evils remaining for which there
is no apparent remedy. For example, the criteria established for
finding a violation of section 8 emphasize the motivation for partially closing down. A finding of motivation was considered to be
a necessary prerequisite "in an area which trenches so closely upon
otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives . .. " Even in the
absence of an and-union motive it is possible that the practical ef19 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), where it
was said:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of commercial activity as the closed
plant, of sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a benefit
from the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to close
their plant with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a
relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that
its employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they
persist in organizational activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has
been made out. Id. at 275-76.
It should be noted that the above criteria are apparently not so stringent as to require
"dependent operation, sameness in character of work and unity of labor relations" for
establishing an unfair labor practice. Instead, persons exercising control over a plant
need only have such a substantial interest in another business that a closing motivated
by anti-unionism will foreseeably cause employees in the other business to fear that their
plants will also close down if they persist in union activities.
Furthermore, at the present stage of proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board, the Board has withheld ruling on whether the record should be reopened for
further hearing, but has ordered that General Counsel for the National Labor Relations
Board file a bill of particulars describing the nature of the evidence it expects to use
should the record be reopened. The Board felt that such additional information would
assist it in determining whether the proposed evidence would so materially relate to
the issue of "purpose" and "effect" as to justify reopening the record. In its order for
a bill of particulars, the Board considered the following information to be relevant: (1)
Any publicity that may have been circulated, its source, and by whom it was circulated
if known; (2) The nature of the knowledge of employees of Deering-Milliken Mills,
generally; (3) A description of statements made or action taken; (4) Any additional
evidence; and, (5) A description of any documentary evidence to be offered including
its title, date, author, party to whom addressed, and a summary of its contents. 4 CCH
LAB. L. REP. § 9717, at 16477 (Oct. 7, 1965).
20 Id. at 276.
21 Id. at

276.

